Minnesota License Plate Reader Laws

Status at a glance

What the law covers

Section 13.824 defines an automated license plate reader as a device mounted on a law enforcement vehicle or in a fixed location that records vehicle or plate data and compares it to law enforcement databases. The definition also covers readers owned by someone other than a government entity “to the extent that data collected by the reader are shared with a law enforcement agency” (subd. 1). That matters for privately owned cameras such as HOA systems. See private and HOA cameras.

What may be collected and matched

• Collection is limited to plate numbers; date, time and location data; and pictures of plates, vehicles and the surrounding areas. “Collection of any data not authorized by this paragraph is prohibited” (subd. 2(a)).
• ALPR data is private or nonpublic, except where other provisions of the data practices law make it public or classify it as active criminal investigative data (subd. 2(b)).
• Data may be matched only with the Minnesota license plate data file, unless additional sources relate to an active criminal investigation. A central state repository of ALPR data is prohibited unless explicitly authorized by law (subd. 2(c)).

Tracking requires a warrant

ALPRs “must not be used to monitor or track an individual who is the subject of an active criminal investigation unless authorized by a warrant, issued upon probable cause, or exigent circumstances justify the use without obtaining a warrant” (subd. 2(d)). This is a state statutory requirement, separate from the unsettled federal question of whether ALPR tracking is a Fourth Amendment search. See warrants and ALPR data.

Retention: 60 days, and a preservation right

Data not related to an active criminal investigation “must be destroyed no later than 60 days from the date of collection” (subd. 3(a)). Minnesota also gives people facing charges a specific tool. On written request from “an individual who is the subject of a pending criminal charge or complaint,” with the case or complaint number and “a statement that the data may be used as exculpatory evidence,” data that would otherwise be destroyed must be preserved until the charge or complaint is resolved or dismissed (subd. 3(b)).

Inactive criminal investigative data follows the general records retention schedule (subd. 3(d)). For why preservation matters, see requesting ALPR records in discovery.

Sharing and access

• Data not related to an active criminal investigation may be shared with another law enforcement agency only if the request meets the access standards in subdivision 7. The receiving agency must follow the same classification, destruction and security rules (subd. 4(a)–(b)).
• Otherwise, such data “may not be shared with, disseminated to, sold to, or traded with any other individual or entity unless explicitly authorized” (subd. 4(c)).
• Access must be authorized in writing by the agency head or a designee. Each access must be based on “a reasonable suspicion that the data are pertinent to an active criminal investigation” and must include a record of the factual basis and any associated case number (subd. 7(b)).

Public logs and biennial audits

Agencies must keep a public log of ALPR use: times of active collection, aggregate numbers of vehicles read, the databases compared against, hit counts by category, and the locations of fixed readers. Agencies must also keep a list of current and previous fixed reader locations, accessible to the public unless the agency determines the data are security information, a determination subject to in-camera judicial review (subd. 5).

Agencies must arrange an independent biennial audit, and the results are public. If the commissioner of administration finds “a pattern of substantial noncompliance,” the agency must suspend all ALPR operation until reinstated (subd. 6). As an example, the Minneapolis City Auditor’s audit of the Minneapolis Police Department for 2023–2024, presented in February 2026, found the department “complies with all requirements in state statute governing ALPR use.” It recommended independent review of vendor assurance reports and formally approved procedures for access, retention checks and access reviews.

What this can mean in a Minnesota case

• If you’ve been charged, ask your attorney promptly about a written preservation request under subd. 3(b).
• Was ALPR data used to track a person under active investigation? If so, was there a warrant or a claimed exigency (subd. 2(d))?
• Does the access record show reasonable suspicion, a factual basis and a case number (subd. 7)?
• Was data matched against sources beyond the Minnesota plate file, and was it related to an active investigation (subd. 2(c))?
• What do the agency’s public log and latest biennial audit show?