Montana License Plate Reader Laws

Status at a glance

A general ban, with exceptions

Montana’s law starts from a prohibition. Except as subsection (2) allows, “an agency or employee of the state or any subdivision of the state may not use, either directly or indirectly, a license plate reader on any public highway” (MCA 46-5-117(1)). The definition of “license plate reader” is broad. It covers devices used to determine a vehicle’s ownership, location, route or occupants, including an “automated license plate recognition system” (46-5-117(4)(b)).

The exceptions cover transportation planning, regulated parking, truck screening at weigh stations and ports of entry, an agency tracking its own vehicles, and state or local law enforcement that meets the requirements in subsection (2)(d). The ban reaches government agencies and employees. It doesn’t address private cameras directly. Whether “either directly or indirectly” reaches police use of privately operated systems is an open question. See private and HOA cameras.

When police may use ALPRs

Under 46-5-117(2)(d)(v), operating a reader and accessing its data “must be for official law enforcement purposes only.” A reader may be used only to identify a vehicle that is:

• stolen;
• associated with a wanted, missing, or endangered person;
• registered to a person with an outstanding warrant;
• in violation of commercial trucking requirements;
• “involved in case-specific criminal investigative surveillance”;
• “involved in a homicide, shooting, or other major crime or incident”; or
• “in the vicinity of a recent crime and may be connected to that crime.”

Data obtained under subsection (2)(d) “must be obtained, accessed, preserved, or disclosed only for law enforcement or criminal justice purposes” (46-5-117(2)(d)(iii)). Systems must be updated from the agency’s databases every 24 hours if an update is available (46-5-117(2)(d)(vii)).

Stops based on an alert

“A positive match by a license plate reader alone does not constitute reasonable suspicion as grounds for a law enforcement officer to stop a vehicle.” The officer must either develop independent reasonable suspicion, or “immediately confirm visually” that the plate matches the image on the reader and confirm by other means that the plate meets one of the permitted-use criteria (46-5-117(2)(d)(vi)). See ALPR alert traffic stops.

Retention: 90 days, and preservation

Captured plate data from a law enforcement system “may not be preserved for more than 90 days after the date that the data is captured” (46-5-118(1)). It may be kept longer under a preservation request, a state search warrant issued under 46-5-220, or “a federal search warrant issued in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (46-5-118(2)). That last phrase is the statute’s own wording.

The preservation process in 46-5-118(3) is written for “the request of a law enforcement agency.” The agency must give a sworn written statement naming the camera locations, the plate, the dates and timeframes, the case and parties, and “specific and articulable facts” showing the data is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal or missing persons investigation. Preserved data is destroyed one year after the initial request unless another request arrives, which resets the year (46-5-118(4)). The statute doesn’t provide a defense preservation request. See requesting ALPR records in discovery.

Policies, audits and user records

• Before a system is operational, each agency must adopt and publicize a written policy covering databases used, retention, sharing with other law enforcement agencies, training, supervision, access and security, and “access to data obtained by automatic license plate reader systems not operated by the law enforcement agency” (46-5-117(2)(d)(i)).
• “At least once every year,” the agency must audit its system use and effectiveness and report to the agency head (46-5-117(2)(d)(ii)).
• Agencies must “maintain a record of users who access license plate reader data. The record must be maintained indefinitely.” They must also keep maintenance and calibration schedules and records (46-5-117(2)(d)(iv)). See ALPR audit logs and search records.

Public records and sale

Captured plate data “is a public record but is protected from disclosure under the provisions of Title 2, chapter 6, parts 10 through 12, except to the person to whom the license plate is registered” (46-5-118(5)). Nothing in the section requires disclosure if an agency determines it “will compromise an ongoing investigation” (46-5-118(6)). Data “may not be sold for any purpose except as provided in 46-5-117” (46-5-118(7)). The statute has no clause on sharing with out-of-state agencies.

Penalties and the planning-data evidence rule

A public employee or officer who violates 46-5-117 “is subject to the applicable penalties provided for in Title 2, chapter 2” (46-5-117(3)).

The statute contains one evidence rule, and it is narrow. Subsection (2)(a)(i) lets the department of transportation or an incorporated city or town use a reader “to collect data for planning,” with anonymity required. It then says: “Data collected under this subsection (2)(a)(i) without a search warrant or outside of judicially recognized exceptions to search warrant requirements may not be used to investigate or prosecute an individual or as evidence in court.” By its words, that sentence covers only planning data collected under (2)(a)(i). The law enforcement provisions in (2)(d) contain no comparable evidence rule in the text we reviewed.

One agency’s policy: Valley County

Valley County Sheriff’s Office Policy 419 is one agency’s policy, not state law, and its setup may not be typical. It says the office works with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration under a memorandum of understanding, and that data “is stored within the DEA and the National License (NLPRP) Network Server, for a period of 90 days.” It says data “may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law,” and that “ALPR system audits should be conducted on a regular basis.” Other Montana agencies may differ.

What this can mean in a Montana case

• Which permitted purpose under 46-5-117(2)(d)(v) did the agency rely on?
• For a stop on an alert, did the officer develop independent reasonable suspicion, or visually confirm the plate and its status first (46-5-117(2)(d)(vi))?
• Was data kept past 90 days, and if so, under which preservation request or warrant?
• What does the agency’s indefinite record of users show about who accessed the data?
• Did the agency adopt and publicize a policy before its system went live, and what does it say about access to systems it doesn’t operate?
• Was the data from a privately operated system, and does “either directly or indirectly” matter?